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INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST A UNION'S VIOLATION
OF A NO-STRIKE CLAUSE
One of the clauses most frequently found in collective bargaining agreements
is a "no-strike" clause, whereby the union agrees to refrain from using work
stoppages as a method of economic coercion.- The recent trend toward the use
of such clauses has made it increasingly important to delineate the legal conse-
quences of the union's breach of its promise not to strike. Among the possible
consequences are: (1) justifiably imposed discipline or discharge of the em-
ployees participating in the breach, and cessation of the employer's obligations
under the collective bargaining agreement; (2) an award of money damages
either by an arbitrator or by a court before which suit is brought under Section
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act; and (3) an award of injunctive relief by either a
court or arbitrator. Since the last possibility is most controversial, this Comment,
after briefly discussing the problems raised by the first two possibilities, will
focus upon the issue raised by the third-whether the courts or an independent
arbitrator may award injunctive relief against the union's violation of a no-
strike clause.
DISCHARGE, DIsCIPLINE, AND MONEY DAMAGES
The union's agreement not to strike creates a condition of employment for the
employees affected.2 The Supreme Court has held that the activity of an indi-
vidual violating such an agreement is not protected by the National Labor Re-
lations Act,3 except where the strike was stimulated by an unfair labor practice
of the employer. 4 Once strikers are found to be unprotected by the provisions of
the act, they may be discharged, 5 and the employer may refuse to reemploy
them upon termination of the strike.6 Discipline such as this is not an unfair
labor practice.
7
Under certain circumstances, a strike in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement could also constitute an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley
Act, thereby giving rise to an unfair labor practice complaint.8 The National
1 One survey indicated that such clauses were found in approximately 947 of the collective
bargaining agreements in 1965. BNA Lab. Rel. Expediter 94 (1965).
2 An employee's breach of the agreement would justify the imposition of discipline or
even his discharge. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 246 (1962). In a suit
based on the breach of a no-strike clause, the Supreme Court stated that the promise not
to strike "at the very least establishes a rule of conduct .... " Ibid.
3 NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939); see International Union, UIMW v.
NLRB, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (dictum).
4 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
5 See NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944); cf. NLRB v. Rockaway
News Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80 (1953).
6 See United Biscuit Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1942). The breach of the
no-strike clause may relieve the employer of his obligation to bargain with the union on
behalf of those violating the agreement. Ibid. For example, a walkout without due notice
to the union or to the employer, in breach of a no-strike clause, has been found to be a
material breach of the contract which justified a subsequent "recission" of the collective
bargaining agreement by the employer. United Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338,
341 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981 (1956).
7 NLRB v. Rockaway News Co., supra note 5; NLRE v. Sands Mfg. Co., supra note 3.
8 Cf. Gilmour v. Local 74, Wood Lathers Union, 223 F. Supp. 236, 241-42 (N.D. Ill.
132
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Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction is not divested simply because the conduct
constituting the unfair labor practice also violated the collective agreementy
On the other hand, jurisdiction of the courts in a suit under section 301 is
not displaced simply because the conduct complained of would also constitute
an unfair practice,10 and the same conduct can result in both an unfair labor
practice complaint and an action for breach of contract."
Money damages, of course, is a likely remedy in a breach of contract action
in either state or federal courts.12 It is also generally accepted that an arbitrator
has the power to award damages for the breach of a promise not to strike.'3
In fact, the Supreme Court has to a significant extent shown a preference for
the forum of arbitration for the adjudication of claims for damages flowing from
the breach of a no-strike clause.14 Such an attitude has led to use of the defense
of arbitrability in damage suits brought by the employer. Hence, where a broad
arbitration clause exists, the union may request that the employer's suit for
violation of a no-strike clause either be stayed or dismissed on the theory that
the damage claim is arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement. 15
1963). However, an unfair labor practice cannot be made out simply by showing a breach
of the contract. Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437, 443 (1955); A. I. Gage Plumbing Co. v. Local 300, International Hod Carriers
Union, 202 Cal. App. 2d 197, 20 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1962). "A strike in violation of the contract
is not per se an unfair labor practice . .. .' Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery
Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 265 (1962); see Lodge 12, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron
Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467, 473 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958). The Senate
version of section 301 made the breach of a collective agreement a violation bf the NLRA.
But in the conference committee, this provision of the Senate Bill was discarded. See Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 207 (1962).
9 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
10 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, supra note 9, at 197; see United Steelworkers v. New
Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352, 358 (10th Cir. 1959).
11 Gilmour v. Local 74, Wood Lathers Union, supra note 8. Further, in light of Old
Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union, 359 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1966), the employer, where
there is an 8(b) (4) violation, may be able to collect money damages under section 303,
even if there is an arbitration clause.
12 See Spelfogel, "Enforcement of No-Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Actions and
Discipline," 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 239, 240 (1966) ; Note, 39 Ind. L.J. 387 (1964).
13 Cf. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 988-89 (2d Cir.
1942); Hiller v. Liquor Salesmen's Union, 226 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Marchant v.
Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co, 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929). For example, in staying pro-
ceedings against a union and two employers pending arbitration, a district court recognized
that the question of the amount of damages involved was for the arbitrator. Hiller v. Liquor
Salesmen's Union, supra at 165. While the agreement providing for arbitration did not
expressly provide for the awarding of damages, the court grounded the arbitrator's authority
in the general arbitration clause. "In the absence of clear language . . . . to the contrary
[the arbitration provisions] must be construed to authorize the award of damages . .. .
Id. at 166.
14 See Schubert, "Arbitration and Damage Claims for Violation of the No-Strike Clause,"
16 Lab. LJ. 751, 755 (1965).
15 Ibid. See Spelfogel, supra note 12, at 254-55. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50,
American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962), involved a suit by an employer against
the union for damages flowing from the union's alleged violation of a no-strike clause. The
limited question before the Supreme Court was the correctness of the district court's holding
that the employer's claim was an arbitrable subject under the collective bargaining agree-
ment and, therefore, the propriety of staying the action pending arbitration. Id. at 255. The
Court found that the alleged breach of the no-strike clause, and the damages flowing there-
from were arbitrable under the contract. The company argued that the no-strike clause was
so fundamental to the contract that the breach thereof must be deemed to estop the union
from demanding arbitration. But the Court held that the arbitration provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement "are meant to survive breaches of contract . . . ." Id. at
262. The Court was not denying the possible right to damages but was simply "remit[ting]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
A court or arbitrator's award of money damages and disciplinary action by
the employer, however, may be little recompense to the employer whose enter-
prise is being destroyed by breach of the no-strike clause. Hence, injunctive relief
is often sought in both court litigation and arbitration proceedings.
SUIT FOR SPECrFIC PERFORMANCE OF A PROmISE NOT To STRIKE
A. Suit in the Federal Courts
In the landmark decision of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,16 the
Supreme Court held that Section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, in addition to
affording the federal courts jurisdiction over breach-of-contract actions involv-
ing labor organizations in industries affecting commerce, authorized the federal
tribunals "to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of... collective
bargaining agreements .... "1 Though the federal substantive law to be formed
included the availability of a directive for specific performance of a promise to
arbitrate,18 the question of whether the federal courts could enjoin a strike in
violation of a no-strike clause remained unanswered.
Subsequent to Lincoln Mills, the Second and Seventh Circuits held that such
a strike fell within the phrase "labor dispute"'19 in Section 4(a) of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act,2 0 which provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-
straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involv-
ing or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons
participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein
defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment ....
the company to the forum it agreed to use for processing its strike damage claims." Id. at
266. The Court further limited its holding:
We do not decide in this case that in no circumstances would a strike in violation of
the no-strike clause contained in this or other contracts entitle the employer to rescind
or abandon the entire contract or to declare its promise to arbitrate forever discharged
or to refuse to arbitrate its damage claims against the union.
Id. at 265. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962), where the Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's refusal to dismiss an action for damages under section
301. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that the company was obligated to arbitrate
and, therefore, that the action should have been dismissed or stayed pending arbitration.
Here, the collective bargaining agreement provided only for arbitration of "employee
grievances" when the arbitration machinery was invoked by the union. Since the company
could neither submit grievances nor invoke arbitration on its own option, the contract
could not possibly be construed to bind the company to arbitrate a claim for damages
flowing from a violation of the no-strike clause. Id. at 241.
16 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
17 Id. at 451, construing 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964), which provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
18 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
19 Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 290 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1961), aff'd, 370 US. 195
(1962); A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 US. 932 (1958). See also Third Ave. Transit Corp. v. Quill, 192 F.2d 971 (2d Cir.
1951) (Norris-LaGuardia Act applicable to a labor dispute although the action amounted
to a violation of the collective agreement).
20 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
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Thus both courts concluded that an injunction would be unavailable to the
complaining party. However, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion
in Local 795, Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 21 and subse-
quently, the Supreme Court was squarely presented, in Sinclair Ref. Co. v.
Atkinson,22 with thequestion of whether Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act in
effect repealed Section 4 (a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Sinclair Refining held
that specific performance of the promise not to strike, i.e., an injunction against
the strike which violates the no-strike clause, was not available in the federal
courts2 3
The Court found, as had the Second and Seventh Circuits, that such strikes
arose from "labor disputes" as defined in Norris-LaGuardia and that the in-
junction prayed for was therefore proscribed by section 4(a). Rejecting the
argument that the Court had the power to judicially "accommodate" the Norris-
LaGuardia Act with Section 301 of Taft-Hartley, the Court looked to the legisla-
tive history of the latter statute and found that the House bill had specifically
provided for repealing the prohibitions of Norris-LaGuardia with respect to suits
under section 301. But this bill was dropped by the conference committee and
was never enacted into law.
B. Suit in the State Courts
In a suit for breach of a collective agreement, a Massachusetts court in Court-
ney v. Charles Dowd Box Co.24 awarded a money judgment. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and affirmed, holding that section 301 (a) did not divest the
state tribunal of jurisdiction over a breach-of-contract action between an em-
ployer and a labor organization.25 The Court found that Congress did not intend
"to encroach upon the existing jurisdiction of the state courts."2 But while
Dowd Box held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction under section 301,
and indicated that they could enforce rights created by federal law,27 Teamsters
Union v. Lucas Flour Co. 28 left no doubt that it was federal substantive law
that was to be applied by the state tribunals in suits under section 301.29 In
light of these two cases, then, the issue which Sinclair clearly left unanswered
was whether the Norris-LaGuardia mandate that federal courts could not enjoin
strikes under section 301 would become part of the federal substantive law obli-
gatory upon the state courts.
3 0
Prior to Sinclair many jurisdictions sanctioned the issuance of an injunction
21 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960), rev'd, 370 U.S. 711 (1962).
22 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
23 Id. at 203. The Sinclair Court distinguished an earlier case, Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957), where it had upheld the issuance
of an injunction prohibiting a strike. The Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45
U.S.C. §§ 152-53 (1964), which controlled in Chicago River, called for compulsory arbitra-
tion of a "minor dispute." That strike therefore violated an "affirmative duty," imposed
by statute.
24 341 Mass. 337, 169 N.E.2d 885 (1960).
25 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
28 Id. at 509.
27 Id. at 507.
28 Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
29 Id. at 102-04.
30 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, supra note 25, at 514 n.8; see Note, 19 Rutgers
L. Rev. 507 (1965).
1966]
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against a strike in violation of a collective bargaining agreement.31 Decisions
awarding injunctions were normally grounded either in simple contract law and
the equity jurisdiction of the state court, or upon the premise that Taft-Hartley
was intended to effectuate the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
32
Perhaps the best known of the pre-Sinclair state court cases is McCarroll v.
Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters.33 Justice Traynor, anticipating
the holdings in Dowd Box and Lucas Flour, declared that state courts have con-
current jurisdiction with federal tribunals under section 301 and must apply
federal substantive law.3 4 Recognizing that federal courts could not issue injunc-
tions, Traynor confronted the question of whether state courts could do so.
He concluded that Norris-LaGuardia was drawn as a limitation on only federal
equity power and did not restrict the "remedial power of the state courts.13 5
Section 301, therefore, did not require a state court to withhold the issuance of
an injunction. "Uniformity in the determination of the substantive federal right
itself is no doubt a necessity, but such uniformity is not threatened because a
state court can give a more complete and effective remedy."38
Although McCarroll was but one of the many state court decisions holding
that the states were not divested of jurisdiction over suits seeking injunctions
for the breach of a collective agreement, 37 it was not without a strong dissent.
Justice Carter argued that a state tribunal could not afford a "more stringent
or different relief" than could be afforded by a federal tribunal.3 8 Looking back
to Lincoln Mills, which determined the availability of the remedy of specific
performance, he concluded that the availability of particular remedies is part
of the federal substantive law applicable to a state court action brought under
301. The difference between injunctive relief being available or unavailable to
31 See Spelfogel, "Enforcement of No-Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Actions and
Discipline," 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 239 (1966). Aaron, "Labor Injunctions in the State
Courts-Part I," 50 Va. L. Rev. 951, 953 n.7 (1964) lists 33 states which have not
adopted any comprehensive statutory controls over the issuance of labor injunctions. These
states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West
Virginia.
82 See Spelfogel, supra note 31, at 242.
33 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
34 McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 60, 315
P.2d 322, 330 (1957).
35 Id. at 63, 315 P.2d at 332.
36 Id. at 64, 315 P.2d at 332-33.
ST See Connecticut Co. v. Division 425, Street & Electric R.R. Employees, 147 Conn. 608,
164 A.2d 413 (1960); Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. Local 702, United Brick
Workers, 339 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1960); Miller v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 332
S.W.2d 18 (Mo. App. 1960); Anchor Motor Freight N.Y. Corp. v. Local 445, Teamsters
Union, 12 Misc. 2d 757, 171 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County) aff'd, 5 App.
Div. 2d 869, 171 N.Y.S.2d 511 (2d Dep't 1958); General Electric Co. v. International Union,
UAW, 93 Ohio App. 139, 108 N.E.2d 211 (1952), appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 555, 110
N.E.2d 424 (1953); International Longshoremen's Union v. Harvey Aluminum, 226 Ore. 94,
359 P.2d 112 (1961); Springer v. Powder Power Tool Corp., 220 Ore. 102, 348 P.2d 1112
(1960); Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 382 Pa. 326,
115 A.2d 733, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 843 (1955) ; Associated General Contractors of America,
Inc. v. Trout, 59 Wash. 2d 90, 366 P.2d 16 (1961); Clark v. Hen-Werner Corp., 8 Wisc. 2d
264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959).
88 McCarroll v. Los Angeles, supra note 34, at 70, 315 P.2d at 336 (dissenting opinion).
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the complaining party is not a mere difference in procedure but "goes to the
very essence of the right itself."39
This reasoning, however, was not typical of state court decisions prior to
Sinclair. Most agreed with the majority in McCarroll. The following statement
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is representative.
There does not exist any repugnance or conflict, direct or indirect, be-
tween the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of equity as in the instant case
and the Labor Management Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
*. . Prevention of violation of obligations contained in a contract by in-
junctive relief is a power traditionally exercised by courts of this Com-
monwealth.
40
What, then, is the federal substantive law which the state court is obliged to
apply in suits under 301? Can a breach of a no-strike clause be enjoined under
that law? The dissent in McCarroll and Professor Aaron 4 1 answer that federal
substantive law includes the restrictions embraced in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Aaron argues that injunctive relief is of such a different nature from other
forms of relief that it must be considered a distinct right; therefore, to allow
the complainant in the state tribunal to obtain injunctive relief, while denying
that relief in the federal courts, would create a distinction in the substantive
rights of the parties depending on the forum in which the action was com-
menced. Under this view Sinclair, in holding that section 301 did not repeal
Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia, amounted to a determination that section 4
"must be read into the federal policy enunciated in Section 301.1142 Professor
Aaron admits, however, that some doubt is cast upon this conclusion by the
Sinclair reference43 to the federal courts' lack of power to enjoin strikes.44 But
Professor Gregory, in commenting upon Justice Traynor's conclusion that the
existence or nonexistence of the restrictions of Norris-LaGuardia was a differ-
ence of remedial and not of substantive law, found it to be immaterial whether
the limitations-of Norris-LaGuardia were considered substantive or remedial.45
He points out that the paramount concern "is . . . that only one law and one
scheme govern in the enforcement of collective agreements made in the federal
arena." 46 Uniformity in the law is intended to preclude "forum shopping.
4 7 If
injunctive relief from the violation of a no-strike agreement were available in
the state courts, complainants would rush to the state tribunals.48 The law ap-
39 Id. at 72, 315 P.2d at 338 (dissenting opinion).
40 General Bldg. & Contractors As'n v. Local Union 542, 370 Pa. 73, 82, 87 A.2d 250,
255 (1952).
41 Aaron, "Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions," 63
Colum. L. Rev. 1027 (1963).
42 Id. at 1035.
43 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 214 (1962).
44 Aaron, supra note 41, at 1035-37.
45 Gregory, "The Law of the Collective Agreement," 57 Mich. L. Rev. 635, 652-53
(1959) (an address delivered to an institute on collective bargaining and the law).
46 Id. at 652.
47 Ibid.
48 Summers, "Labor Law Decisions of Supreme Court 1961 Term," A.B.A. Section of
Labor Relations Law Proceedings 51, 63 (1962) (quoted in part in Aaron, supra note 41).
1966]
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plied under section 301 might then be fashioned initially by the state courts,
with but occasional review by the Supreme Court.
49
Despite the above arguments, and absent clear statutory prohibition,50
many state courts have continued since Sinclair to enjoin strikes which violate
no-strike agreements. 51 New York, although having a "baby Norris-LaGuardia
Act," has found that a strike in breach of a no-strike clause does not fall within
the meaning of a "labor dispute" as defined in its act.5 2 New York courts have
held that their jurisdiction has not been removed by any federal authority 58 and
have expressed the opinion that to allow the union to strike, notwithstanding
the contract clause, would amount to making the agreement binding upon the
company but not upon the union.51 New York courts have, therefore, continued
to enforce the collective agreement and to enjoin the breach of it.55
Having previously held that the Taft-Hartley Act did not relieve the state
courts of jurisdiction to issue an injunction against a violation of a collective
agreement, 55 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently declared that
Lucas Flour did not impose the anti-injunction limitations of Norris-LaGuardia
on state proceedings. 57 The court recognized that Norris-LaGuardia expressed
a congressional policy against injunctions, 8 but concluded that the anti-injunc-
tion policy was limited to injunctions granted by federal courts.5 9 Enactment
of section 301, without either totally or partially repealing Norris-LaGuardia,
firmly indicated approval of the "existing federal labor policies which limit the
injunctive jurisdiction of federal courts, but which do not attempt to limit that
of state courts."60 This reasoning has been found in the majority of state court
decisions.61 There is, however, some opinion to the contrary. A lower New Jersey
49 Ibid. Professor Summers, however, seems to feel that section 301 was intended as a
supplement to state court remedies.
50 Although interpretations may differ, for anti-injunction statutes, see Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
48, § 2a (Smith-Hurd 1950); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 214, § 9A (1955); N.Y. Lab. Law § 807
(formerly N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 876-a); Pa. Stat. Ann. fit. 43, § 206f (1964). One writer
lists Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
as having some sort of anti-injunction statute. Comment, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 495, 497 n.13.
51 See Comment, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 495.
52 Employers Ass'n v. Operating Engineers, 60 L.R.R.M. 2006 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. West-
chester County 1965); see Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n v. Conrad, 33 Misc. 2d 914,
228 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County), aff'd mem., 16 App. Div. 2d 869, 229 N.Y.S.2d
736 (4th Dep't 1962).
53 C. D. Perry & Sons, Inc. v. Robilotto, 39 Misc. 2d 147, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct.
Rensselaer County 1963), aff'd per curiam, 23 App. Div. 2d 949, 260 N.Y.S.2d 158 (3d
Dep't 1965).
64 Strecher-Traung Lithograph Corp. v. Lithographers' Union, 46 Misc. 2d 925, 260
N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1965).
55 C. D. Perry & Sons, Inc. v. Robilotto, supra note 53.
66 Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 382 Pa. 326,
115 A.2d 733, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 843 (1955).
57 Shaw Elec. Co. v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 418 Pa. 1, 208 A.2d 769
(1965).
58 Id. at 12, 208 A.2d at 775.
59 Id. at 6-14, 208 A.2d at 772-76.
60 Id. at 13, 208 A.2d at 776.
61 In A. I. Gage Plumbing Supply Co. v. Local 300, Int'l Hod Carriers Union, 202 Cal.
App. 2d 197, 20 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1962), a contractor's action for an injunction against a
strike in breach of the no-strike clause, the court concluded, citing Dowd Box and McCarroll,
that a cause of action could be premised upon an existing collective bargaining agreement
for an injunction, damages, or arbitration, in the state tribunal. In Radio Corp. of America
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court, finding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was an integral part of federal
labor policy, concluded that section 4 must be considered under section 301:
[T] his court believes that it must either apply the Norris-LaGuardia Act
... directly in the instant case or at least interpret our own Anti-Injunc-
tion Act in light of the Norris-LaGuardia Act so that it is not incompatible
with it.
6 2
C. Removal of Injunction Suit From State to Federal Court
Assuming that the holdings of Lincoln Mills (application of federal substan-
tive law under section 301), Sinclair (federal courts precluded from enjoining a
strike in breach of a collective agreement), and Lucas Flour (state courts must
apply federal substantive law) do not require state courts to apply the restric-
tions of Norris-LaGuardia, which by its terms applies to federal courts, the
question then arises whether an action seeking only injunctive relief, com-
menced in a state court, may be removed to a federal district court. Since fed-
eral courts cannot award this type of injunctive relief, this question is of unique
importance. If the defendant union can obtain removal, the state court would
then be denied the power it otherwise might have to enjoin the strike.
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act vests the federal district courts with
original jurisdiction to entertain a cause of action based upon the breach of a
collective bargaining contract.6 3 Dowd Box affirmed the concurrent jurisdiction
of the state tribunals. Thus, in a suit for only specific performance of a no-strike
clause, whether removal from the state to the federal court should be allowed is
dependent upon the meaning of "jurisdiction" as used in Section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.64 As Section 1441(a) of the Judicial Code provides that a de-
fendant may remove an action from the state court in which it was commenced
to a federal court if the district court has "original jurisdiction" over the ac-
tion,65 the crucial question becomes whether the district court has jurisdiction
v. Local 780, Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Employees, 160 So. 2d 150 (Fla. App.), cert.
denied, 169 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965), the Florida District
Court of Appeal held that the lower state court had jurisdiction over an action, brought by
an employer, for the enforcement of a no-picketing and no-strike clause of the agreement,
and therefore, allowed the enjoining (with modification) of the striking and picketing. For
state court issuances of injunctions for violations of the collective bargaining agreement, see
McLean Distrib. Co. v. Brewery Drivers Union, 254 Minn. 204, 94 N.W.2d 514, cert. denied,
360 U.S. 917 (1959); McLean Trucking Co. v. Doyle, 17 Misc. 2d 478, 184 N.Y.S.2d 114
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd mem., 8 App. Div. 2d 789, 188 N.Y.S.2d 943, motion for
leave to appeal denied, 9 App. Div. 2d 677, 193 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1st Dep't 1959); Republic
Aviation Corp. v. Republic Lodge 1987, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 10 Misc. 2d 783, 169
N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1957); Bee Line, Inc. v. Long Island Local 252,
TWU, 157 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1956); Masetta v. National Bronze &
Aluminum Foundry Co., 107 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio App. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 159
Ohio St. 306, 112 N.E.2d 15 (1953); Alabama Cartage Co. v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, 250 Ala. 372, 34 So. 2d 576 (1948).
62 Independent Oil Workers v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 85 NJ. Super. 453, 459-60, A.2d
78, 82 (1964). See Commercial Can Corp. v. Local 810, Steel Fabricators, 61 NJ. Super.
369, 160 A.2d 855 (1960) (strike in violation of collective bargaining agreement is labor
dispute, not enjoinable under the New Jersey anti-injunction statute). Maryland has
followed New Jersey and has held that its state statute makes the issuance of an injunction
against a strike violating the contract unavailable. Tidewater Express Lines v. Freight
Drivers Union, 230 Md. 450, 187 A.2d 685 (1963).
63 Quoted, in part, supra note 17.
64 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
65 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964) provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought
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to permit the action to commence before it, Norris-LaGuardia simply divesting
it of authority to issue an injunction, or whether the district court lacks the
"original jurisdiction" necessary for the action to be removed.66
As Professor Aaron has recognized, 67 it would appear at first that a suit by
an employer for injunctive relief would not be removable under section 1441 (a),
since Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia appears to relieve the district courts of
"original jurisdiction." The weight of judicial authority supports this view.6 8
In a suit prior to the Sinclair decision69 for injunctive relief from the breach
of a no-strike clause, the defendant removed the action to the district court.
The court granted the petition for remand, stating that it would be absurd to
have a case brought before it "in which there is no power to give the relief de-
manded, due to surviving prior limitations. ' 70 In another injunction action,
removed from the California courts, the district court granted plaintiff's motion
to remand for lack of jurisdiction in the federal tribunal.71 Finding that the
strike arose from a labor dispute, the court held that Norris-LaGuardia re-
moved the jurisdiction of the federal court. But, of special significance, the
court rejected the defendant's contention that the action should not be remanded
for lack of jurisdiction in the state tribunal. Even if the application of federal
substantive law were held to relieve the state court of authority to enjoin the
strike, this could not be a basis for refusing to remand. Section 1447 of the
Judicial Code was said to require the remand of any case, removed from a state
court, in which the federal tribunal was without original jurisdiction.72 Lack of
jurisdiction in the state court was immaterial.
In American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Operating Engineers,7" the only court
of appeals decision on this question, the Third Circuit rejected the view that
Norris-LaGuardia did not strip federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction but
only relieved the courts of the "power to grant injunctive relief."7 4 In holding
that section 301 did not give the district court the subject-matter jurisdiction
necessary to comply with the "original jurisdiction" requirement of section
1441(a) of the Judicial Code, the court expressly relied upon the Sinclair"
holding which had affirmed the district court's dismissal "for lack of jurisdic-
tion."'7 6 This language was thought to embrace subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Third Circuit proceeded to pinpoint some of the consequences flowing
from a district court's denial of the motion to remand. The first of the injus-
tices" enunciated by the court was the deprivation of the plaintiff's right to be
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original juris-
diction, may be removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.
66 See Note, 39 Ind. L.J. 387, 391 (1964).
67 Aaron, supra note 41, at 1041.
68 See Comment, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 495, 499; Note, 44 N.C.L. Rev. 188, 190 (1965).
69 Castle & Cooke Terminals, Ltd. v. Local 137, Int'l Longshoremen's Union, 110 F.
Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953).
70 Id. at 251.
71 Merchants Refrigerating Co. v. Warehouse Local 6, Int'l Longshoremen's Union, 213
F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
72 Id. at 178.
73 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964).
74 Id. at 839-40.
75 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962).
76 American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Operating Engineers, supra note 73, at 840.
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"master of its own case," that is, "to cast its action on state-created rights rather
than on rights available under federal law. . . -77 It is here that the Third Circuit
seemed to err. The court, in effect, admitted that the difference in the avail-
ability of injunctive relief goes to the complainant's "right," that is, that the
difference is one of substance. The Supreme Court has clearly held that it is
federal substantive law which applies to suits for the breach of a collective
bargaining agreement. The right to proceed in a state court is not to be denied
the complainant, but his action is to be governed by "rights" created under
federal law. Therefore, if the Third Circuit is to be taken literally, the state
court must also dismiss the action. As this does not appear to be the intended
result of the Third Circuit's decision, one can only conclude that the court
recognizes and accepts the existence of a substantive disparity between the
rights of litigants in federal and state courts. This was essentially the position
espoused in the dissenting opinion.78 The dissenting judge argued that the sole
determinant of the rights asserted in the action was federal law. The suit being
identical to Sinclair, except that it was brought in a state court, Lucas Flour
compelled the application of federal law. Succinctly put, "any state law author-
izing the enforcement of a no-strike clause by injunction is incompatible with
and, therefore, cannot be absorbed in federal labor law." 79
The dissent in American Dredging was not without judicial support. In Crest-
wood Diary, Inc. v. Kelley"o a federal district court stated that although the
prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act specifically denied "'jurisdiction' to
issue an injunctive order . . . each inhibition necessarily assumes the exis-
tence of a 'case' of which the court has jurisdiction and which it must, and has
the power to, adjudicate in accordance with the standards the Act imposes."
81
The court held that an action resting upon an alleged breach of contract is gov-
erned by federal law, thus necessitating adjudication in the federal court when
that court's jurisdiction was invoked upon removal, even if the injunctive relief
sought plainly could not be awarded. The court considered Norris-LaGuardia a
part of substantive law, but reasoned that even if the act be considered as a
limitation only on the equity jurisdiction of federal courts so that the state
courts' power to grant the labor injunction would not be impaired, this distinc-
tion between the equity jurisdiction of the federal and state judiciary would
not be a basis for denying the right to remove.
8 2
In an earlier case dealing with a prayer for injunctive relief against union
picketing, a district court held that Norris-LaGuardia did not prevent it from
hearing the case nor awarding other than injunctive relief.83 The court deter-
mined that the criterion of whether a case may be removed is not the ultimate
disposition of the case, but rather the applicability of federal law and whether
it governs the suit as set forth in the complaint.84 Finally, in Publishers' Ass'n
77 Id. at 846.
78 Id. at 857-58 (dissenting opinion).
79 Id. at 857.
80 222 F. Supp. 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
81 Id. at 615.
82 Id. at 617.
83 Pocahontas Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. Trade Council, 93 F. Supp. 217 (D. Me.
1950).
84 Id. at 225. But cf. Monmouth Canning Co. v. Local 340, Truckdrivers Union, 140
F. Supp. 304 (D. Me. 1956).
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v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union,8 5 a district court addressed
itself to the question of removal and, citing American Dredging as authority to
the contrary, held that a suit for breach of a no-strike clause "arises" under fed-
eral law. "To hold otherwise would be to disregard the Supreme Court's holding
in ... Lincoln Mills ...... 86 Finding that the "jurisdiction" removed from the
federal courts by virtue of Norris-LaGuardia referred only to the court's au-
thority to award injunctive relief after taking cognizance of the suit, the court
noted that any other finding would be "unreasonable" in light of the district
court's authority to hold a hearing and make determinations of fact under section
7 of the act.
8 7
Professor Chafee supported the view that Norris-LaGuardia did not divest the
federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.88 Summarizing Chafee's thesis that
"inability to grant the specific relief requested is not the same as lack of jurisdic-
tion over the substance of the litigation,"8 9 Aaron also concludes that federal
tribunals retain original jurisdiction over a suit for specific enforcement of a
no-strike clause and, therefore, removal should be sanctioned under section
1441(a)90 He maintains that the federal tribunals retain the ability to effec-
tively adjudicate the substance of the controversy.9 1 As indicated in Tri-Boro
Bagel Co. v. Bakery Drivers Union,92 a prayer for "such other relief as the court
may deem just and proper" would authorize the court, under Rule 54(c) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure,98 to award money damages if it found the action
to be a proper one. That case, moreover, sanctioned removal even if the action
be immediately dismissed on the ground that Norris-LaGuardia prohibited is-
suance of the injunction sought.94 The Southern District of New York has also
taken cognizance of Rule 54(c) and has stated that it would enable a federal
court, in an action for an injunction alone, to assume jurisdiction of the suit
and to award appropriate relief.95 This argument was rejected in American
Dredging,9 6 however, with the court citing Rule 82 of the Federal Rules.97
D. Suit for Specific Performance Joined to a Claim for Damages
It is clear that an employer may bring an action for damages for the union's
breach of its agreement not to strike. Such an action may be brought in either
a state or federal tribunal, but if commenced in a state court, it may be removed
85 246 F. Supp. 293, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
86 Ibid.
87 Id. at 295.
88 Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 367-74 (1950).
89 Aaron, supra note 41, at 1045.
90 Id. at 1046.
91 Ibid.
92 228 F. Supp. 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
93 Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judg-
ment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.
94 Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery Drivers Union, supra note 92, at 724.
95 Publishers Ass'n v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union, 246 F. Supp.
293, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
96 American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Operating Engineers, 338 F.2d 837, 848-49 (3d Cir.
1964).
97 Rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "These rules shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue
of actions therein."
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to a federal court. No impediment such as the Norris-LaGuardia Act raises any
doubt as to this.
Under Section 1441(c) of the Judicial Code, when an action which alone
would be removable is joined with one not removable, the entire matter may
be removed although the district court retains the discretion to remand that
which otherwise would not be within its original jurisdiction." Assuming that
an action for specific performance alone is not within the original jurisdiction of
the district court, and is therefore not removable under section 1441(a), what
are the consequences when a prayer for money damages is added to the com-
plaint? Although in American Dredging the circuit court concerned itself with
a prayer for "such other relief" and not with one specifically for money dam-
ages, the court did state that the prayer did not create a separate cause of action
so as to base jurisdiction, upon removal, on 1441(c) .P There is, however, a
judicial basis for the distinction suggested. The district court in Kroger Co. v.
Retail Clerks,100 in remanding a suit to enjoin a strike to the state court, dis-
tinguished those cases in which a prayer for money damages was included. 101
In an earlier district court case, where the complaint prayed for money damages
and injunctive relief, the court held the prayer for money damages to be prop-
erly removable but remanded the prayer for an injunction to the state court.'
02
And in National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Heffernan,03 the district court, defining
"jurisdiction" as used in the Norris-LaGuardia Act to mean the ability to en-
tertain the suit, stated that while an action for injunctive relief alone could not
be "originally instituted" in a federal court, a federal tribunal "would have
original jurisdiction of a suit seeking both an injunction and damages."' 0 4 The
court held that two separate claims as stated were premised upon independent
wrongs: the action for damages was based upon the past conduct of the union,
while injunctive relief was sought for protection from anticipated future con-
duct. Under 1441(c), therefore, the entire case was removed. Then, finding
that it lacked jurisdiction over the claim for injunctive relief, the court imme-
diately dismissed that claim, but not upon the merits.
05
In H. A. Lott, Inc. v. Hoisting Engineers,0 6 the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas assumed, without deciding, that the Heffernan reading of
"jurisdiction" was correct. The court stated that if the prayers for damages and
injunctive relief were considered as presenting but a single claim, removal would
be upheld. 10 7 If, however, the complaint was considered to have alleged two
distinct causes of action, the result would still be the same, for then injunctive
98 28 US.C. § 1441(c) (1964) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be
removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise nonremovable
claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may
determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not other-
wise within its original jurisdiction.
99 American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Operating Engineers, supra note 96, at 849.
100 56 L.R.R.M. 2893 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
101 Ibid.
102 Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1959).
3 195 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
104 Id. at 156.
105 Ibid.
108 222 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
107 Id. at 994.
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relief would be removable under 1441(c) when joined with the claim for dam-
ages.
0 8
E. A Recommended Approach to Suits for Injunctive Relief
It is submitted that Lincoln Mills, Sinclair, and Lucas Flour compel the con-
clusion that the federal labor policy, fashioned under Section 301 (a) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, does not permit the issuance of an injunction to enjoin the
breach of a no-strike clause. The states therefore are divested of the authority
to issue a labor injunction in the very same circumstances. Appropriate enough
are Professor Hanslowe's words:
These jurisdictional-procedural-remedial difficulties are quite unavoid-
able consequences of the section 301 imbroglio, of which the Sinclair de-
cision is merely a crowning touch. Given Sinclair, it is difficult to see how
blatant forum shopping can be avoided and uniformity preserved (and
uniformity is surely an aim of the Supreme Court's pre-Sinclair decisions),
except by (at least) allowing removal, and (possibly) by following the
dissent in the McCarroll case, treating the problem as one of substance,
and limiting the state courts' equity powers in section 301 cases, to conform
to Sinclair.09
If this view is accepted, then, as the dissent in American Dredging pointed
out,"10 a complainant would not be deprived of injunctive relief simply because
his action was removed to the federal tribunal; the injunctive relief would be
precluded in any forum by operation of federal law.
If the Sinclair decision is not deemed to have incorporated the restrictions of
Norris-LaGuardia into federal substantive law, then the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral district court (upon removal) should not depend "upon the ingenuity of
the form of a complaint in equity.""' While the power of the court to issue
an injunction is believed to go to the substance of the complainant's rights, a
court's inability to issue an injunction need not divest it of "jurisdiction" over-
the suit. If a suit for injunctive relief is to be remanded to a state court, a
complaining party would derive the benefit Sinclair denied him.
Professor Aaron has suggested, however, that federal courts are likely to re-
mand a claim for injunctive relief to the state court, whether or not joined by
a claim for damages.112 Further, to deny the availability of injunctive relief in
state tribunals would be to eliminate a remedy available before the enactment
of section 301."13 Nonetheless, regardless of whether a claim for damages is
linked to a claim for injunctive relief, removal of the latter to the federal courts
should be sustained. Without relegating legal niceties to a status of lesser im-
portance, the primary consideration is that there be uniformity in the law
governing the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements under section 301.
108 Id. at 995. Rule 54(c) is set out, in part, at note 83 supra.
109 Hanslowe, "Labor Relations Law," 16 Syracuse L. Rev. 244, 256 (1965).
110 American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Operating Engineers, 338 F.2d 837, 858 (dissenting
opinion).
Ill Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Council, 229 F. Supp. 123, 127 (EfD. Pa.
1964) (effectively overruled by American Dredging).
112 Aaron, "Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions,"
63 Colum. L. Rev. 1027, 1051-52 (1963).
118 Ibid.
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ARBITpuATION
A promise not to strike, within a collective agreement, becomes a term of that
agreement. The standard grievance procedure, culminating in arbitration, covers
the "meaning, interpretation and application" of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.114 An alleged breach of the promise not to strike may be considered as
involving an "application" of the collective bargaining agreement, and, there-
fore, arbitration is a possible consequence of that breach.
The arbitration trilogy of 1960115 provides necessary background for discus-
sion of this topic. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co. 116 and United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co. 1 7 involved suits under 301(a) to
compel arbitration. In these two cases the Supreme Court limited the function
of the judiciary to ascertaining whether the claim for arbitration is "on its face
... governed by the contract" and ruled out any consideration of the merits
of the claim.1 8 The question for the judiciary is limited to whether there was
an agreement to arbitrate the grievance. 1 9 "Doubts should be resolved in favor
of coverage."' 20 In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.'
l
the Court created a strong presumption in favor of the enforceability of an arbi-
trator's award. Again, doubt should be resolved in favor of the award being
within the scope of the arbitrator's authority.
122
A. Arbitrator's Power To Enjoin a Strike in Violation of the Agreement
An arbitrator is "commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bargain-
ing agreement .... " 2 3 He brings an "informed judgment to bear in order to
reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true [of] ... remedies."'24
Where a breach of a no-strike clause has been alleged, employers have often
sought arbitration for an interpretation of the "terms" or "application" of the
agreement. In many instances, striking and picketing in violation of the agree-
ment have been enjoined by order of the arbitrator' 2 5
But rarely can the express intention of the parties be found to bestow upon
the arbitrator the power to enjoin a strike. Rather, finding their intention is often
a process of assuming an implied intention in light of the presumptions created
by the law. 26 The Court is willing to allow great leeway in upholding an arbi-
trator's finding that he has been given the authority to afford a remedy.'
27
"14 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 US. 564, 565 (1960).
"15 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
116 Supranote 115.
117 Supra note 115.
118 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., supra note 115, at 568.
119 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 115, at 582.
120 Id. at 583.
121 363 US. 593 (1960).
122 Id. at 597.
=23 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 General American Transp. Corp., 41 Lab. Arb. 214 (1963) (enjoined striking and
picketing in violation of the agreement); Liebman Breweries, Inc., 35 Lab. Arb. 384
(1960) (dearer agreement involved); see United Parcel Service, Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. 560
(1963) (enjoining strike).
126 See text accompanying notes 118-21 supra.
127 See discussion of Enterprise Wheel accompanying note 131 supra.
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It must be recognized that in creating a collective bargaining agreement, the
parties have looked towards the preservation of a harmonious relationship. While
strife at the outset of their relationship may be caused by attempting to come
to explicit terms on every aspect of their agreement, it may be argued that the
very purpose of agreeing to arbitrate violations of the agreement is to allow the
arbitrator to preserve, uphold, and effectively enforce their agreement. Enjoin-
ing the breach of the agreement would certainly come within these bounds.'28
In Macy's New York, 129 for example, employees of the retail department were
enjoined from picketing and demonstrating in connection with a dispute between
the employer and the warehouse employees. And in Ford Motor Co.,130 local
officers and members of the union were involved in an unauthorized strike in
violation of a no-strike clause. The arbitrator awarded a cease and desist order
against the striking and the inducing of others to strike.
B. Enforceability of the Arbitrator's Award
The arbitrator's power to enjoin labor activities has seldom been judicially
reviewed. Upon a motion to confirm the award of the arbitrator, the Supreme
Court of New York upheld an injunction enjoining the union "from causing
members to refuse to handle or move certain cargo intact in 'containers' to named
consignees."''1 1 Previously, in Ruppert v. Egelhofer,132 the New York Court
of Appeals had explicitly approved the power of the arbitrator to enjoin labor
activities. In the arbitration proceeding, prior to that case, the arbitrator en-
joined a labor organization from continuing a slowdown. Though the court ad-
mitted that the agreement did not "directly affirm or deny such a power,"' a3 it
argued that only the injunction would effectuate the intent of the parties-the
elimination of work stoppages. Believing that the existing anti-injunction statute
would prohibit the issuance of the injunction by the court without an addi-
tional findings of fact, the court frankly admitted that the judicial confirmation
of the injunction amounted to a court-ordered injunction. "But, once we have
held that this particular employer-union agreement not only did not forbid but
contemplated the inclusion of an injunction in such an award no ground remains
for invalidating this injunction."'134 This conclusion fits nicely into the reasoning
of the trilogy: first there is a presumption of arbitrability and then a resolution
of ambiguity in favor of finding the authority for the arbitrator's award. Re-
solving both presumptions in favor of enforceability, the court can conclude
that the arbitrator has the authority to enjoin the dispute.
In a suit brought in a federal court for the enforcement of an arbitration
award ordering the union to cease and desist work stoppages in violation of
the agreement, the district court distinguished those cases holding that a court
could not enjoin a strike violating a no-strike clause by finding that "the
parties . . . agreed to be bound by the decision of the arbitrator, and the
128 See discussion of Ruppert v. Egelhofer at text accompanying notes 132-34 infra.
129 40 Lab. Arb. 954 (1962).
130 41 Lab. Arb. 619 (1963).
131 Matter of N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 54 L.R.RM. 2680, 2681 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1963), enforcing 41 Lab. Arb. 809 (1963).
132 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1958).
'33 Id. at 581, 148 N.E.2d at 130, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
134 Id. at 581-82, 148 N.E.2d at 131, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
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plaintiff is entitled to have the award of the arbitrator enforced."'' 8 5 Since both
this district court decision and Ruppert predate Sinclair, one cannot predict with
certainty how these cases would now be decided. It is suggested, however, that
the outcome would not be changed by the latter decision.
Regardless of whether one thinks that Sinclair is part of the federal law the
states are obliged to apply under 301, there is a distinction between the order
of the arbitrator, chosen by the parties and vested with authority by them, and
the judicially issued injunction. Where the collective bargaining agreement has
given the arbitrator the power to determine the remedy for a violation of con-
tract, under the rationale of Enterprise Wheel the court may find a basis upon
which to rest the arbitrator's power to enjoin the violation of a no-strike
clause.13 6 This reasoning would appear to apply to federal and state courts
alike.187 Moreover, where the arbitrator's power to enjoin is not expressly con-




Injunctive relief would appear to be of such an entirely different nature from
either an order to arbitrate or an award of damages that its unavailability
in federal courts must be said to be part of the federal labor policy. Without
negating the intent of Congress in passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and
with due deference to the legalistic arguments over the meaning of the term
"jurisdiction" as used within that act, it is submitted that given the holdings
of Lincoln Mills, Sinclair, and Lucas Flour, and given the over-all intent of
Congress in the passage of our labor laws, the authority of the state tribunals
to enjoin a strike in violation of a labor agreement (in the federal arena) has
been removed. If, however, this approach is not accepted, then uniformity in
our labor law would seem to demand approval of those judicial precedents
upholding the jurisdiction of the federal courts upon removal of a suit for
specific performance of a no-strike clause.
But there are other considerations:
Breach or violation of the no-strike provision of the agreement cannot
be tolerated nor condoned. Indeed, it is difficult to envision any action or
activity more likely to reduce a labor agreement to a worthless scrap of
paper, to irreparably impair the parties' relationship and more inimical
to the best economic interests of Company, Union and workers alike, than
the indulgence in its violation.'3 9
Where management and labor alike recognize these considerations and vest
authority in an arbitrator to adjudicate controversies arising between them,
then the arbitrator's use of the full scope of power allotted to him should be
judicially approved and enforced. Indulgence should be given to the arbi-
185 New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 49 L.R.RM. 2941, 2942
(E.D. La. 1962).
136 Spelfogel, "Enforcement of No-Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Actions and
Discipline," 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 239, 262 (1966).
187 See Comment, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 495, 500 (1963).
18 See Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 581, 148 N.E.2d 129, 131, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785,
787 (1958).
130 United Parcel Service, Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. 560 (1963).
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trator's discretion. "When the judiciary undertakes to determine the merits
of*a grievance under the guise of interpreting the grievance procedure of
collective bargaining agreements, it usurps a function which under that regime
is entrusted to the arbitration tribunal."'140
If the arbitrator, then, is deemed capable of wielding the power to enjoin
a strike in breach of the agreement, the remaining question concerns when
should he be deemed to have that authority? The Supreme Court affords
the answer in Enterprise Wheel. 14 The widest latitude is to be allowed the
arbitrator in interpreting the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement,
for "it is [his] . . . construction which was bargained for."'142 If uniformity is
then diminished somewhat, the resulting diversity will be based upon the
parties' own choosing within the favored framework of arbitration.
George B. Yankwitt
140 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 569 (1960).
141 See text accompanying notes 121-22 supra.
142 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US. 593, 599 (1960).
